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Abstract
We present a general equilibrium model of the new neoclassical synthesis that has the
same level of generality as the Arrow-Debreu model. This involves a stochastic multi-
period economy with a monetary sector and sticky commodity prices. We formulate
the notion of a sticky price equilibrium where all agents form rational expectations on
prices for commodities and assets, interest rates, and rationing. We present a general
result showing that monetary policy imposes no restrictions whatsoever on nominal
equilibrium price levels and that the set of sticky price equilibria has a dimension
equal to the number of terminal date-events. Stickiness of prices implies that this
indeterminacy is real.
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1 Introduction
The new neoclassical synthesis is a term used by Goodfriend and King (1997) to refer to a
class of models that incorporate elements of apparently irreconcilable traditions of macroe-
conomic thought. On the one hand there are the exible price models of the new classical
macroeconomists and real-business-cycle analysis, in which monetary policy is unimpor-
tant for real economic activity, and on the other hand there are the sticky-price models of
the New Keynesian economics, in which monetary policy is central to understanding real
economic activity. The integration of these two streams in the literature leads to a class
of models with four central elements: intertemporal optimization, rational expectations,
optimal price-setting, and costly price adjustment.
The workhorse of the new neoclassical synthesis is a simple general equilibrium model
involving ination, output, and nominal interest rates at various date-events as its main
variables. Crucial in these models is the existence of imperfections in setting commodity
prices, which causes them to respond with some lag to changes in market conditions. Price
stickiness is then the main channel through which monetary policy aects real variables.
The main objective is to study how aggregate variables like ination and output are aected
by the adoption of various alternative policies.
The aim of the current paper is to provide a formulation of the new neoclassical synthe-
sis that has the same level of generality as the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model.
This involves an extension of the new neoclassical workhorse to a setting with multiple
commodities, multiple heterogeneous agents having general preferences, general monetary
transaction technologies, and a general approach towards price stickiness. In such an exten-
sion, households optimize intertemporally given rationally anticipated prices of commodi-
ties and assets, interest rates, and the monetary transactions technology, and whenever
prices are not sticky, they do not adjust mechanically to some measure of disequilibrium,
but are derived endogenously.
To achieve these objectives, we extend the Arrow-Debreu model in three ways. First,
we follow Arrow (1953) and specify a setting with sequentially opening markets for com-
modities as opposed to the Arrow-Debreu framework with a complete set of markets for
contingent commodities. Second, we follow Clower (1967) and require that all purchases
and sales of commodities in spot markets are made against money. We specify a general
monetary transaction technology in the spirit of Dreze and Polemarchakis (2001). Third,
we introduce a general model of price stickiness where future commodity prices are either
inherited from the past or are determined endogenously to achieve market clearing. Our
modeling of price stickiness incorporates frequently used specications by Taylor (1980)
and Calvo (1983) as special cases.
A particular period in the model starts with transactions on the asset markets with
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households trading Arrow securities and collecting dividends on their previous period's
asset portfolios. Next, during the period, transactions on spot markets for commodities
take place against money, and transactions with the bank occur exchanging bank loans
against money. Monetary needs are determined by the monetary transactions technology
and depend on commodity prices and the consumption bundles that are chosen. The bank
charges interest on nominal debts, which households pay at the end of the period. Since
households hold nominal debts in the aggregate, the bank creates seignorage, which is
returned to the bank's shareholders at the end of the period in the form of dividends. This
modeling choice implies that we implicitly assume a Ricardian scal policy.
The policy of the bank involves the specication of interest rates that are set conditional
on the date-event. This is in accordance with the observation in Woodford (2003) that
monetary policy decision making by central banks almost everywhere means a decision
about the operating target for an overnight interest rate. The reason for making the
interest rate the operating target is that the alternative where the bank tries to directly
control monetary aggregates has become less eective as a consequence of increases in the
sophistication of the nancial system.
A central feature of the new neoclassical synthesis is that monetary policy has non-
trivial consequences. The key reason is the assumption that commodity prices are not
continually adjusted, but remain xed for at least short periods. Indeed, price stickiness is
a well-documented empirical phenomenon. Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), for instance,
report that the median duration of a price across sectors is around one year. Price stickiness
can be caused by a variety of reasons, but the typical explanation follows Sheshinksi and
Weiss (1977) and is based on the existence of menu costs, caused both by the real costs
associated with the transmission of prices to the consumers as well as with the decision
process itself.
The standard approach in the macroeconomic literature is to specify constant elasticity
of substitution in utility and production functions a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). This
makes it possible to derive closed{form expressions for prices that are set by producers
in an environment of imperfect competition. Such an approach does not generalize to a
setting with general preferences as has been argued by Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977),
who show that equilibrium price and quantity choices may fail to exist even in extremely
simple cases. To keep the feature that prices are determined endogenously in equilibrium,
we stick to the standard general equilibrium paradigm of competitive markets. At all
date-events where the price of a commodity can be adjusted, its level is determined by
the forces of supply and demand, where supply and demand is derived from fully rational
intertemporally optimizing agents.
In periods where commodity prices are xed, prices are typically not market clearing,
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resulting in excess supply or excess demand of commodities. In periods where prices cannot
adjust, markets are equilibrated by quantity adjustments, where the long side of the market
is rationed by the amount of trade on the short side. Here we follow the modeling approach
developed by Dreze (1975) in the context of a general equilibrium model with upper and
lower bounds on prices.
We formulate the concept of a sticky price equilibrium. At a sticky price equilibrium
all households optimize given rational expectations. More precisely, at a sticky price equi-
librium all households hold common and correct point expectations of all prices, rationing,
interest rates, and dividends conditional on all possible date-events. Prices and rationing
schemes are determined endogenously by the requirement of market clearing on commodity
markets and asset markets, where sticky prices are set equal to the previous period's value.
Allocations of commodities, assets, and money follow from optimizing behavior by the
households, subject to the constraints imposed by the monetary transaction technology.
Our goal is to demonstrate the existence of a sticky price equilibrium under general
assumptions on initial endowments, preferences, transaction technologies, and price stick-
iness. In an ad hoc macroeconomic model, Sargent and Wallace (1975) developed the
insight that the price level is indeterminate under an interest rate rule. This insight has
spurred an extensive literature debating the indeterminacy of equilibrium in models with
Ricardian scal policy, see Woodford (2003) for a detailed treatment of this literature and
Cochrane (2011) for a recent discussion. Beyond equilibrium existence, we are therefore
interested in obtaining an indeterminacy of equilibrium result in our general setting.
For each terminal date-event, we select one commodity with a exible price, and set
this price equal to an arbitrary value. Next we prove that each such specication of prices
is consistent with some sticky price equilibrium, which demonstrates that sticky price
equilibria exist and that the set of sticky price equilibria has dimension at least equal to
the number of terminal date-events. The equilibrium nominal price level at terminal date-
events is arbitrary, irrespective of the interest rate policy by the bank. We argue that price
stickiness implies that this indeterminacy is real.
Our model contains several widely studied general equilibrium models as special cases.
This brings up the issue as to how the indeterminacy result is related to equilibrium
existence results that have appeared previously in the literature. The standard Arrow-
Debreu model corresponds to the case with one time period, one terminal date-event, no
price stickiness, and zero interest rates charged by the bank on nominal debt. Such a model
has a one-dimensional multiplicity of equilibrium indeed, which is usually suppressed by
making use of zero-homogeneity of demand functions to normalize prices. Indeterminacy
of equilibrium is entirely nominal.
The standard model of price rigidities as presented in Dreze (1975) corresponds to the
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case with one time period, one terminal date-event, and zero interest rates charged by
the bank on nominal debt. For this model one-dimensional multiplicity of equilibrium
is shown in Herings (1996a), extending such a result for supply-constrained equilibria in
van der Laan (1982). For a one-period model where some prices are exible and some
are downwards rigid, Citanna, Cres, Dreze, Herings, and Villanacci (2001) nd a one-
dimensional multiplicity of equilibrium that is real.
In a multi-period model of a monetary economy without price stickiness, a model that
contains Arrow (1953) as a special case, Dreze and Polemarchakis (2001) nd that the
dimension of the set of equilibria is equal to the number of terminal date-events, where the
multiplicity is entirely nominal. Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005) extend these ideas to
a simple fully articulated two-period macroeconomic model, where the multiplicity is real
when producers set prices one period in advance.
From a technical point of view, the main complication in our model is a result of the fact
that nominal prices are sticky, which implies that nominal commodity prices have to enter
the xed point argument, and that it is not possible to restrict attention to commodity
prices in present-value terms. Since there are no a priori upper bounds on nominal price
variables, we consider appropriate limits of economies with compactied price variables. A
particular diculty that has to be addressed is to make sure that the well-known cheaper-
point assumption is satised in terms of present-value prices, both for compactied as for
limit economies. Cases where exploding nominal commodity prices are oset by Arrow
security prices that converge to zero have to be dealt with carefully.
The indeterminacy result can be understood as a simple consequence of counting equa-
tions and unknowns. There are as many markets for commodities and assets as there are
instruments to clear them, which would suggest that equilibria are determinate. However,
there is a budget constraint at the beginning of each date-event and there is a budget con-
straints at the end of each terminal date-event, where each constraint serves as a Walras'
law, and leads to one additional degree of freedom for equilibrium. Since the policy of the
bank consists of setting as many interest rates as there are date-events, each interest rate
reducing the degrees of freedom by one due to a no-arbitrage condition on asset prices, we
are left with the number of terminal date-events as the dimension of the set of equilibria.
One channel by which indeterminacy of equilibrium could be reduced is suggested in Magill
and Quinzii (2010) and consists of introducing additional instruments for the central bank.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main ingredients of our model
{ an intertemporal stochastic economy with a general monetary transaction technology
and sticky prices { and the concept of sticky price equilibrium. Section 3 explicitly lists
all assumptions that are needed for a proof of the general indeterminacy result. Section 4
is devoted to a study of the continuity properties of the budget correspondence. To study
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sticky price equilibria, it is helpful to represent the price and rationing in the market of a
single commodity by a single parameter, and to dene the concept of a parametrized sticky
price equilibrium, which is equivalent to but more tractable than the notion of a sticky
price equilibrium. This is the topic of Section 5. In Section 6 we present the main result
of the paper about indeterminacy of sticky price equilibria. Section 7 discusses this result
and Section 8 considers potential extensions. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
We provide a formulation of the new neoclassical synthesis that has the same level of
generality as the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. There is an event tree T with
the set of date-events S as nodes. The set S is partitioned into subsets S0; : : : ; ST ; where
St consists of the date-events st in period t: We distinguish between dates and periods,
where date t represents the starting point of period t and date t+1 its end point. We will
also refer to date-events st and periods st to distinguish between points and intervals of
time. There is a unique date-event s0 at t = 0; the current date-event.
The set of successors of date-event st is denoted by s
+
t ; a subset of St+1: For notational
convenience, we introduce a set of date-events ST+1 with the same cardinality as ST : There
is a one-one relationship between date-events in ST and those in ST+1: The related date-
event in ST+1 corresponds to the end point of period sT and is the unique element of s
+
T :
We denote S+ = [st2Ss+t ; so S+ = (S [ ST+1) n fs0g: The unique predecessor of st 2 S+
is denoted by s t ; an element of St 1:
In each period st 2 S there is trade in a nite set L of commodities by households in
a nite set H: The price of commodity ` at date-event st equals p`st : Among other things,
the event tree is used to describe when price adjustments take place. Based on a detailed
analysis on the distribution of the frequency of price changes in Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) report that the median frequency of monthly price
change across sections in the U.S. economy is 8.7%, implying that the median duration of
a particular price across sectors is around one year. These authors also report considerable
heterogeneity in this frequency across sectors. For most commodities, therefore, price
adjustments do not take place at every period. As in Debreu (1959), the event tree is
suciently rened for all prices to be constant in period st:
At each date-event st 2 S; the price of commodity ` 2 L is either sticky or can be
adjusted. For each ` 2 L; this leads to a partition of S consisting of the sets N s` and Na` :
The price of commodity ` can be adjusted at a date-event st 2 Na` : The set N s` consists
of those date-events, where the price of commodity ` is sticky, and therefore equal to p`s t :
When the price of commodity ` is sticky at date-event s0; it is inherited from the price
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p`s 1 set at date-event s 1; a price that is exogenously given at s0: We allow for the case
where the price of commodity ` is exible at all date-events, in which case Na` = S; the
case where the price of commodity ` is xed at all date-events, Na` = ;; as well as all the
intermediate cases. The specication in Taylor (1980), where prices are sticky for a xed
number of periods, and the specication of Calvo (1983), where it is determined by chance
whether a price can be adjusted, are both obtained as special cases.
Since the price of commodity ` at date-events in N s` is sticky, the markets of these
commodities are cleared by quantity adjustments. Violations of voluntary trading are
not allowed for. This deviates from part of the macroeconomic literature where quantity
adjustments are made by forcing the short side of the market to accommodate the trades
desired by the long side. Such an approach is not feasible in our general set-up. In our
model, trading on a particular commodity market is not only inuenced by the price, but
also by the maximal amount a household is able to supply of every commodity, called the
rationing scheme on supply, and by the maximal amount a household is able to demand for
every commodity, called the rationing scheme on demand. These constraints are imposed
on the long side of the market and are determined by the short side. Rationing schemes
serve as the matching technology between supply and demand. Since markets are assumed
to be fully transparent, rationing aects the long side of the market only.
Rationing can take many forms. For the sake of simplicity, we consider uniform ra-
tioning, implying that the rationing scheme on supply is described by z 2  RLS+ and
the rationing scheme on demand by z 2 RLS+ ; where R = R [ f+1g denotes the set of
extended real numbers. We model the absence of constraints on a particular market `st by
setting z`st =  1 and z`st = +1; for instance at date-events in Na` ; where rationing does
not take place at equilibrium. The way rationing is modeled is taken from the approach
used by Dreze (1975) to study general equilibrium models with price rigidities, see Herings
(1996b) for a general treatment. In the macroeconomic literature, such an approach is
taken for instance in Svensson (1986). The values of the variables z and z are determined
endogenously in an equilibrium.
Price stickiness involves nominal prices. For nominal prices to be meaningful, we need
to extend the model by a monetary sector. To a large extent, we follow the monetary sector
model of Dreze and Polemarchakis (2001), a model that is compatible with Chapter 2 of
Woodford (2003), and that can be viewed as its general equilibrium extension. Households
hold money for transaction purposes and have a bank loan that is adjusted whenever
withdrawels or deposits of money are made.
On top of the real and the monetary part, we assume sequentially complete asset
markets, where households trade Arrow securities. Contrary to what is common in the
macroeconomic literature, we will not resort to loglinearizations, but rather consider the
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actual supply and demand correspondences of commodities, money, and assets.
The timing of our model is as follows. A period st 2 S starts at date t with transactions
on the asset markets. Asset market transactions involve buying and selling Arrow securities
contingent on future date-events and collecting dividends from the asset portfolio held in
the previous period. Households use the proceeds from asset market transactions to adjust
holdings of the bank loan and money balances. At dates in the interval (t; t+1); transactions
on the spot markets for commodities take place against money, and transactions with the
bank occur exchanging bank loans against money. At date t+1; period st terminates with
the payment of interest due to the bank and the collection of the bank seignorage by the
bank's shareholders.
A more detailed account of the monetary part of the model is as follows. At each period
st 2 S; the bank oers loan and deposit facilities to households against a non-negative
interest rate rst : The bank supplies money balances as demanded by the households. At
 2 [t; t + 1]; household h has a bank loan bhst() and holds money balances mhst(): A
withdrawal of money balances from the bank by the household increases the bank loan by
the same amount, whereas a deposit of money at the bank leads to a decrease of the bank
loan by the same magnitude. Transactions with other households increase money balances
by an amount equal to the value of net sales, but do not aect the bank loan. At the end
of period st; the average bank loan of household h in period st; b
h
st =
R t+1
=t
bhst()d; gives
rise to interest payments equal to rstb
h
st : We do allow for the special case where all interest
rates are equal to zero. When interest rates are all zero and all prices can be adjusted at
all date-events, the real part of our model reduces to Arrow (1953).
A more detailed account of the asset market part of the model follows next. At each
date-event st 2 S there are js+t j Arrow securities, one for each date-event in s+t : An Arrow
security for date-event st+1 is traded at date-event s
 
t+1 against a price qst+1 and pays one
nominal unit if and only if date-event st+1 occurs. Because of the availability of Arrow
securities, markets are sequentially complete. A standard no-arbitrage argument implies
that at equilibrium the sum of the prices of the Arrow securities traded at date-event st
must be equal to 1=(1 + rst): At no-arbitrage prices, asset demand is indeterminate as any
household is indierent between holding one unit less of the bank loan and one unit more
of every Arrow security. To lift this indeterminacy, we set beginning-of-period bank loans
equal to money balances for every household, bhst(t) = m
h
st(t): Notice that we distinguish
between end-of-period bank loans bh
s t
(t) at s t ; where a discrepancy between b
h
s t
(t) and
mh
s t
(t) is possible, and beginning-of-period bank loans bhst(t) at st; which are equal to
mhst(t) by denition.
Aggregate money balances issued by the bank at  are mcst() =
P
h2H m
h
st(); a non-
negative quantity. Average aggregate money balances issued in period st equal m
c
st =
7
R t+1
=t
mcst()d: Since beginning-of-period bank loans are set equal to money balances for
every household, it holds that bcst() =
P
h2H b
h
st() =
P
h2H m
h
st() and b
c
st =
P
h2H b
h
st =P
h2H m
h
st : At the end of period st; the bank collects an amount v
c
st = rstb
c
st of interest
payments as seignorage. The bank issues the entire seignorage as dividends to its share-
holders at the end of the period. Household h receives vhst = 
hvcst at the end of period st
with h the shareholdings of household h:
At date-event st 2 S; i.e. at the beginning of period st; household h has wealth given by
the returns from investments in Arrow securities in the previous period ahst ; plus monetary
holdings at the end of the previous period mh
s t
(t); minus the bank loan at the end of the
previous period bh
s t
(t): Making use of the property that bh
s t
(t  1) = mh
s t
(t  1); it follows
that the monetary holdings minus the bank loan at the end of the previous period equal
net sales of commodities in the previous period plus dividends received minus interest
payments, mh
s t
(t)  bh
s t
(t) = ps t (e
h
s t
  xh
s t
) + vh
s t
  rs t bhs t :
Household h invests his wealth at date-event st in Arrow securities a
h
st+1
; where st+1 2
s+t : It follows that household h faces the following sequence of budget constraints,P
s12s+0 qs1a
h
s1
+mhs0(0)  bhs0(0) = 0;P
st+12s+t qst+1a
h
st+1
+mhst(t)  bhst(t) = ahst +mhs t (t)  b
h
s t
(t); st 2 S n fs0g;
ahsT+1 +m
h
s T+1
(T + 1)  bh
s T+1
(T + 1) = 0; sT+1 2 ST+1;
the lifting-of-indeterminacy identities
bhst(t) = m
h
st(t); st 2 S;
and the accounting identities
mhst(t+ 1)  bhst(t+ 1) = pst(ehst   xhst) + vhst   rstbhst ; st 2 S:
Substitution of the accounting identities and the lifting-of-indeterminacy identities in the
budget constraints eliminates the monetary balances mhst(t) and bank loan holdings b
h
st(t):
The only relevant aspects of the monetary transactions are the interest payments rstb
h
st
made by household h at the end of period st:
The value of bh is determined by the transaction technology correspondence h : RLS+ 
Xh ! RS of household h: It assigns to each p 2 RLS+ and consumption bundle xh 2 Xh a
subset h(p; xh) of RS: An element bh of h(p; xh) species the bank loans that are sucient
to carry out purchases and sales involved in consumption of xh when prices are p: A typical
example concerns a Clower (1967) type cash-in-advance technology, where bh 2 h(p; xh) if
and only if bhst  pstxhst ; st 2 S: Alternatively, when cash is only needed for net purchases,
bh 2 h(p; xh) if and only if bhst  pst(xhst   ehst)+; st 2 S; where for a real-valued vector
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z we use the notation z+ = maxf0; zg:1 Both specications make the implicit assumption
that cash needed for purchases is needed in advance, whereas cash resulting from sales is
only available at the end of the period. If, instead, cash resulting from sales is immediately
available for purchases, then the natural specication becomes bh 2 h(p; xh) if and only
if bhst  (pst(xhst   ehst))+; st 2 S:
As in Lucas and Stokey (1987), we can incorporate the distinction between \cash goods"
which are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, and \credit goods" which do not need to
be paid for in cash as would be the case for instance for leisure, and it is entirely possible
to make the cash requirements good specic. The transaction technology can be made
state-dependent, which enables us to model that the monetary transactions technology is
subject to velocity shocks.
The modeling of the transaction technology incorporates a rich variety of other spec-
ications, and allows for specications where households have interest elastic money de-
mand as in the Baumol-Tobin model developed independently in Baumol (1952) and Tobin
(1956). All that is needed is to have one of the commodities ` representing cash-withdrawal
services, the consumption of which diminishes the need for cash balances.
The transaction technology correspondence approach avoids specications where prices
enter the utility function. Utility is derived from the consumption of goods, and the only
way money holdings and prices aect utilities is via the commodities that can be purchased.
The description of an economy E = (T ; (Xh;h; eh; h; h)h2H ; (Na` ; N s` )`2L; ps 1 ; r) is
completed by a specication of (h)h2H ; with h the preference relation of household h
dened on Xh; and a specication of prices ps 1 at date-event s 1; where only the prices
p`s 1 for ` such that s0 2 N s` matter.
The monetary part of the model deviates from the treatment in Dreze and Polemar-
chakis (2001) in two, relatively minor, aspects. The transaction technology there is a
correspondence that assigns a set of feasible consumption bundles and bank loans (xh; bh)
to each price system p: In this paper, we assign a set of feasible bank loans bh to each price
system and consumption bundle (p; xh): A second, more substantial, dierence is that we
allow bank loans to be negative, which would naturally occur when a household makes
many sales in a particular period, resulting in a bank deposit rather than a bank loan.
A household takes prices (p; q); interest rates r; rationing schemes ( z; z); and dividends
vh as given, and chooses a maximal element (xh; ah; bh) for h subject to the constraints
1The maximum of two vectors is dened by taking the componentwise maximum. Similarly, the mini-
mum of two vectors is dened by taking the componentwise minimum.
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xh 2 Xh; bh 2 h(p; xh); z  xh   eh  z; and the sequence of budget constraintsP
s12s+0 qs1a
h
s1
= 0;P
st+12s+t qst+1a
h
st+1
= ahst   ps t (xhs t   e
h
s t
)  rs t bhs t + v
h
s t
; st 2 S n fs0g;
0 = ahsT+1   ps T+1(x
h
s T+1
  eh
s T+1
)  rs T+1b
h
s T+1
+ vh
s T+1
; sT+1 2 ST+1:
(2.1)
The budget set h(p; q; r; z; z; vh) consists of all tuples (xh; ah; bh) satisfying these con-
straints.
We use the notational convention that x is indexed by h 2 H; ` 2 L; and st 2 S; b and
v are indexed by h 2 H and st 2 S; a is indexed by h 2 H and st 2 S+; p; z and z by
` 2 L and st 2 S; and q by st 2 S+:
Definition 2.1A sticky price equilibrium for the economy E is (p; q; z; z; v; x; a; b)
in RLS  RS+  RLS+  RLS+  RHS  RHLS  RHS+  RHS such that
(a) for h 2 H; (xh; ah; bh) is h-maximal on h(p; q; r; z; z; vh);
(b) commodity markets clear,
P
h2H x
h =
P
h2H e
h;
(c) Arrow security markets clear,
P
h2H a
h = 0;
(d) the no-arbitrage conditions hold, for st 2 S;
P
st+12s+t q

st+1
= 1=(1 + rst);
(e) for h 2 H; st 2 S; dividends satisfy vhst = hrst
P
h2H b
h
st ;
(f) for st 2 N s` ; prices equal the previous period's value, p`st = p`s t ;
(g) no rationing when the price is exible, for ` 2 L; st 2 Na` ; z`st =  1 and z`st = +1;
(h) rationing is one-sided, for ` 2 L; st 2 N s` ;
z`st >  1 implies z`st = +1;
z`st < +1 implies z`st =  1:
In Denition 2.1 there is no reference to the variables bcst and m
c
st : They follow from
the accounting identities bcst =
P
h2H b
h
st and m
c
st = b
c
st :
A household is not necessarily inuenced by the constraints on his choices caused by the
rationing scheme (z; z): A household h is constrained on his supply in the market for contin-
gent commodity `st at (p; q; r; z; z; v
h) if there exists (x^h; a^h; b^h) 2 h(p; q; r; z^; z; vh); where
z^ equals z; except that z^lst =  1; such that for all (xh; ah; bh) 2 h(p; q; r; z; z; vh); x^h is
strictly preferred to xh: The denition for a household to be constrained on his demand in
10
the market for contingent commodity `st is analogous. There is supply (demand) rationing
in the market for contingent commodity `st at (p; q; r; z; z; v
h) if at least one household is
constrained on his supply (demand) in the market for commodity `st at (p; q; r; z; z; v
h):
There is rationing in the market for contingent commodity `st at (p; q; r; z; z; v
h) if there is
supply rationing or demand rationing in the market for commodity `st at (p; q; r; z; z; v
h):
For the sake of simplicity, we have presented a model of a pure exchange economy. It
is a routine exercise to extend the model and the sticky price equilibrium concept to a
production economy.
3 Assumptions
The assumptions below are made throughout the paper without further mentioning.
A1. For h 2 H; Xh is closed, convex, has a lower bound, and Xh+RLS+  Xh: There exists
xh 2 Xh such that xh  eh:
A2. For h 2 H; h is transitive, complete, continuous, convex, and monotonic: if xh; xh 2
Xh with xh < xh; then xh h xh:
A3. The bank is owned by the households: for h 2 H; h  0; and Ph2H h = 1:
A4. For h 2 H we have:
1. The correspondence h is lower hemi-continuous and closed.
2. Monetary needs are bounded: there exist continuous functions fh : RLS+ Xh !
 RS+; fh : RLS+ Xh ! RS+ such that bh 2 h(p; xh) implies fh(p; xh)  bh and
minf fh(p; xh); bhg 2 h(p; xh):
3. The correspondence h is homogeneous in prices. Consider p; p 2 RLS+ and   0
such that pst = pst and, for st 2 S n fstg; pst = pst : Consider xh 2 Xh: Then
it holds that bh 2 h(p; xh) implies bh 2 h(p; xh); where bhst = bhst and, for
st 2 S n fstg; bhst = bhst :
4. The correspondence h satises the following convexity property: for p 2 RLS+ ;
for xh; xh 2 Xh; it holds that bh 2 h(p; xh) and bh 2 h(p; xh) implies bh +
(1  )bh 2 h(p; xh + (1  )xh) for all  2 [0; 1]:
5. For p 2 RLS+ ; for xh 2 Xh; xh  eh implies 0 2 h(p; xh):
6. For p 2 RLS+ ; for `st 2 L S with p`st = 0; for xh; xh 2 Xh with xh = xh + "e`st
for some " > 0; it holds that h(p; xh)  h(p; xh):
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A5. Only the bank can create money: if x 2QhXh satisesPh xh =Ph eh and, for some
p 2 RLS+ ; for all h 2 H; bh 2 h(p; xh); then
P
h2H b
h  0:
A6. ps 1  0:
The Assumptions A1, A2, A3, and A6 are standard. A4.1 is a standard continuity as-
sumption that is satised by cash-in-advance technologies for instance. We require h to
be closed rather than to be upper hemi-continuous, since the latter assumption is quite
strong for correspondences that are not compact-valued, and would be violated by cash-in-
advance technologies. Assumption A4.2 puts lower and upper bounds on monetary needs.
A natural choice for the functions fh; fh : RLS+ Xh ! RS+ would be
fh
st
(p; xh) =  pst(ehst   xhst)+; st 2 S;
fhst(p; x
h) = pst(x
h
st   ehst)+; st 2 S:
Assumption A4.3 is a standard homogeneity assumption, and A4.4 a standard convexity
assumption. In A4.5 we require that when a consumption bundle involves only sales, no
bank loan is needed. This is natural, since making the sales should result in a bank de-
posit rather than a loan. Similarly, for a consumption bundle involving only purchases,
non-negative bank loans are required. A4.6 states that additional consumption of a com-
modity with a zero price does not require additional money balances.2 A5 requires that all
attainable allocations involve non-negative aggregate monetary holdings.
4 Continuity of Budget Correspondences
How does one prove the existence of a sticky price equilibrium as dened in Denition 2.1?
The rst problem to be taken care of is a continuity problem. The budget correspondence
may fail to be continuous at (p; q; r; z; z; vh): To facilitate the study of continuity, we rewrite
the sequence of budget constraints into a single budget constraint in terms of present-value
prices.
We denote the present-value price at s0 of one unit of income at date-event st 2 fs0g[S+
by q0st : With st(st0) denoting the predecessor of st0 at date t; we have
q0s0 = 1;
q0st = qs1(st)qs2(st)    qst 1(st)qst ; st 2 S+:
The sequence of budget constraints can be rewritten in a more convenient way. When
we multiply the budget constraint at date-event st by q
0
st and add up we getX
st2S
q0st
X
st+12s+t
qst+1a
h
st+1
=
X
st2S+
q0st(a
h
st   ps t (x
h
s t
  eh
s t
)  rs t b
h
s t
+ vh
s t
):
2If this commodity helps in saving on transaction costs, more consumption could actually decrease the
amount of money balances needed, a possibility that is allowed for in the current formulation.
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After canceling the ah-terms which appear on both sides with identical multiplicands, and
rearranging terms, we obtainX
st2S+
q0st(ps t x
h
s t
+ rs t b
h
s t
) =
X
st2S+
q0st(ps t e
h
s t
+ vh
s t
):
Since
P
st+12s+t qst+1 = 1=(1 + rst); we ndX
st2S
(
q0st
1 + rst
pstx
h
st +
q0st
1 + rst
rstb
h
st) =
X
st2S
(
q0st
1 + rst
pste
h
st +
q0st
1 + rst
vhst): (4.1)
It is now straightforward to verify that the original sequence of budget constraints is
equivalent to (4.1) plus the recursive system of equations
ahsT+1 = ps T+1
(xh
s T+1
  eh
s T+1
) + rs T+1
bh
s T+1
  vh
s T+1
; sT+1 2 ST+1;
ahst = ps t (x
h
s t
  eh
s t
) + rs t b
h
s t
  vh
s t
+
P
st+12s+t qst+1a
h
st+1
; st 2 S n fs0g:
(4.2)
Since the ah-terms are neither part of the preferences nor of any of the other constraints,
the consumer choice problem has been reduced to the choice of (xh; bh) with xh 2 Xh and
bh 2 h(p; xh) subject to the single budget constraint (4.1) and the quantity constraints
z  xh  eh  z: Moreover, by substituting ~qst = q0st=(1+ rst); ~pst = ~qstpst ; ~bhst = ~qstbhst ; and
~vhst = ~qstv
h
st ; the budget constraint (4.1) can be rewritten asX
st2S
(~pstx
h
st + rst
~bhst) =
X
st2S
(~pste
h
st + ~v
h
st)
or, even shorter,
~pxh + r~bh = ~peh + ~wh;
where ~wh =
P
st2S ~v
h
st :
We refer to prices ~p as present-value prices, and, more generally, refer to variables with
a tilde as present-value variables. Although our denition for ~p is the most convenient one,
it deviates from what is also referred to as a present-value price, the variable p0 dened
by p0st = q
0
stpst for st 2 S: To see that p0 is also an appropriate present-value price in our
model, consider the case of a cash-in-advance constraint with bhst = pstx
h
st : We see that the
budget constraint (4.1) reduces toX
st2S
p0stx
h
st =
X
st2S
(
1
1 + rst
p0ste
h
st + ~v
h
st):
The right-hand side of this constraint consists entirely of variables which are exogenous to
the household. The prices relevant for the purchase of consumption goods are given by p0:
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When we consider the cash-in-advance constraint on net trades, bhst = pst(x
h
st   ehst)+;
we can rewrite the budget constraint (4.1) toX
st2S
p0st(x
h
st   ehst)+ =
X
st2S
(
1
1 + rst
p0st(e
h
st   xhst)+ + ~vhst):
In this case we obtain a wedge between buying prices p0st and selling prices (1=(1+ rst))p
0
st :
Positive nominal interest rates create distortions and cause equilibrium marginal rates of
substitution of households to dier from one another, thereby leading to absence of Pareto
optimality even in the absence of price stickiness.
It is convenient to introduce the set Q of prices of Arrow securities that are arbitrage-
free,
Q = f(q; r) 2 RS++  RS+ j 8st 2 S;
X
st+12s+t
qst+1 =
1
1 + rst
g:
We dene the correspondence ^h : RLS+  Q RLS+ RLS+ RS+ ! XhRS+ RS by
^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh) = f(xh; ah; bh) 2 Xh  RS+  RS j
bh 2 h(p; xh);
z  xh   eh  z;
~pxh + r~bh  ~peh + ~wh;
ahsT+1 = ps T+1
(xh
s T+1
  eh
s T+1
) + rs T+1
bh
s T+1
  vh
s T+1
; sT+1 2 ST+1;
ahst = ps t (x
h
s t
  eh
s t
) + rs t b
h
s t
  vh
s t
+
P
st+12s+t qst+1a
h
st+1
; st 2 S n fs0gg;
and the correspondence ~h : RLS+  RS+  RLS+  RLS+  R+ ! Xh  RS by
~h(~p; r; z; z; ~wh) = f(xh;~bh) 2 Xh  RS j ~bh 2 h(~p; xh);
z  xh   eh  z;
~pxh + r~bh  ~peh + ~whg:
The two dierences between h(p; q; r; z; z; vh) and ^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh) are the inequality
rather than the equality in the budget constraint, and the use of real numbers rather than
extended real numbers for rationing schemes. The existence proofs are such that the use of
extended real numbers for rationing schemes can be avoided. The inequality in the budget
constraint is introduced to ensure that ^h is non-empty valued. Indeed, by A4, it holds
that 0 2 h(p; eh): Let ah solve the recursive system of equations (4.2) for bh = 0: Then
we have (eh; ah; 0) 2 ^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh): The correspondence h on the other hand, can be
empty valued. Empty values for h(p; q; r; z; z; vh) could for instance occur when z = 0
and vh is strictly positive.
The correspondence ~h is a reformulation of the correspondence ^h in present-value
terms and omits the determination of the ah variables. The proofs of equilibrium existence
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require continuity properties of both the correspondences ^h and ~h; which extend similar
continuity properties for non-monetary economies provided in Dreze (1975) and Herings
(1996a).
Lemma 4.1 The correspondence ~h is lower hemi-continuous and closed at any
(~p; r; z; z; ~wh) 2 RLS+  RS+  RLS+  RLS+  R+ satisfying ~pz < 0 or ~wh > 0:
Proof: Let (~pn; rn; zn; zn; ~w
h
n)n2N be a sequence of points in RLS+ RS+ RLS+ RLS+ 
R+ converging to (~p; r; z; z; ~wh): Let (xh;~bh) be an element of ~h(~p; r; z; z; ~wh): The corre-
spondence ~h is lower hemi-continuous at (~p; r; z; z; ~wh) if there is a sequence (xhn;
~bhn)n2N
such that (xhn;
~bhn) 2 ~h(~pn; rn; zn; zn; ~whn) and (xhn;~bhn)! (xh;~bh):
We consider two cases, 1. ~pxh+r~bh < ~peh+ ~wh and 2. ~pxh+r~bh = ~peh+ ~wh and [~pz < 0
or ~wh > 0]:
Case 1. ~pxh + r~bh < ~peh + ~wh:
We dene the sets L+ = f`st 2 L  S j xh`st > eh`stg; L0 = f`st 2 L  S j xh`st = eh`stg; and
L  = f`st 2 L  S j xh`st < eh`stg: For n 2 N; for `st 2 L ; let h`st;n = z`st;n=(xh`st   eh`st);
then h`st;n  0 since xh`st   eh`st < 0 and z`st;n  0: For n 2 N; for `st 2 L+; let h`st;n =
z`st;n=(x
h
`st
  eh`st); then h`st;n  0 since xh`st   eh`st > 0 and z`st;n  0: Finally, let hn =
min(fh`st;n j `st 2 L  [ L+g [ f1g): Clearly, 0  hn  1: We dene xhn = eh + hn(xh   eh):
Since xh; eh 2 Xh and by the convexity of Xh it holds that xhn 2 Xh: Moreover,
xh`st;n   eh`st = hn(xh`st   eh`st)  h`st;n(xh`st   eh`st) = z`st;n; `st 2 L ;
xh`st;n   eh`st = hn(xh`st   eh`st)  0  z`st;n; `st 2 L ;
xh`st;n   eh`st = hn(xh`st   eh`st) = 0 and so z`st;n  xh`st;n   eh`st  z`st;n; `st 2 L0;
xh`st;n   eh`st = hn(xh`st   eh`st)  h`st;n(xh`st   eh`st) = z`st;n; `st 2 L+;
xh`st;n   eh`st = hn(xh`st   eh`st)  0  z`st;n; `st 2 L+:
Further,
h`st;n =
z`st;n
xh`st
 eh`st
! z`st
xh`st
 eh`st
 x
h
`st
 eh`st
xh`st
 eh`st
= 1; `st 2 L ;
h`st;n =
z`st;n
xh`st
 eh`st
! z`st
xh`st
 eh`st
 x
h
`st
 eh`st
xh`st
 eh`st
= 1; `st 2 L+:
So hn ! 1 and therefore xhn = eh + hn(xh   eh)! eh + xh   eh = xh:
Since h is lower hemi-continuous, there exists a sequence (~bhn)n2N such that ~b
h
n 2
h(~pn; x
h
n) and
~bhn ! ~bh:Moreover, ~pnxhn+rn~bhn ~pneh  ~whn ! ~pxh+r~bh ~peh  ~wh < 0: There-
fore, for n suciently large, ~pnx
h
n+ rn
~bhn  ~pneh  ~whn < 0; so (xhn;~bhn) 2 ~h(~pn; rn; zn; zn; ~whn)
and lower hemi-continuity of ~h follows.
Case 2. ~pxh + r~bh = ~peh + ~wh and [~pz < 0 or ~wh > 0]:
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Let  2 (0; 1] be such that eh+zn 2 Xh for all n suciently large. Such an  exists since
eh 2 int(Xh); so  can be chosen such that eh + z 2 int(Xh); and zn ! z: We dene
e^hn = e
h + zn: For n suciently large, e^
h
n has the following properties,
e^hn 2 Xh; zn  zn = e^hn   eh  0  zn: (4.3)
Since e^hn  eh it holds by A4.5 that 0 2 h(~pn; e^hn): For n suciently large we have
~pne^
h
n + rn0 < ~pne
h + ~whn:
The strict inequality follows since, for n suciently large, ~pz < 0 implies ~pne^
h
n < ~pne
h and
rn0  ~whn; whereas ~wh > 0 implies ~pne^hn  ~pneh and rn0 < ~whn: Moreover, when we dene
e^h = eh + z; then we have that e^hn ! e^h;
e^h 2 Xh; z  z = e^h   eh  0  z; and ~pe^h + r0 < ~peh + ~wh:
Consider the sequence (xhn;
~bhn)n2N as dened in Case 1. It may be assumed that the elements
of this sequence satisfy
xhn 2 Xh; zn  xhn   eh  zn; xhn ! xh; and ~bhn 2 h(~pn; xhn): (4.4)
If ~pnx
h
n + rn
~bhn > ~pne
h + ~whn; then dene 
h
n by
hn =
~pne
h + ~whn   ~pne^hn
~pnxhn + rn
~bhn   ~pne^hn
(4.5)
and if ~pnx
h
n + rn
~bhn  ~pneh + ~whn; then dene hn = 1: It holds that 0  hn  1: We dene
x^hn = e^
h
n + 
h
n(x
h
n   e^hn) and b^hn = hn~bhn: Using the convexity of Xh; it holds that x^h 2 Xh:
By (4.3) and (4.4),
x^hn   eh = hn(xhn   eh) + (1  hn)(e^hn   eh)  zn;
x^hn   eh = hn(xhn   eh) + (1  hn)(e^hn   eh)  zn:
If ~pnx
h
n + rn
~bhn > ~pne
h + ~whn; then by (4.5)
~pnx^
h
n + rnb^
h
n =
~pneh+ ~whn ~pne^hn
~pnxhn+rn
~bhn ~pne^hn
(~pnx
h
n + rn
~bhn) +
~pnxhn+rn
~bhn ~pneh  ~whn
~pnxhn+rn
~bhn ~pne^hn
~pne^
h
n
= ~pne
h + ~whn;
and if ~pnx
h
n + rnb^
h
n  ~pneh + ~whn then because hn = 1
~pnx^
h
n + rnb^
h
n = ~pnx
h
n + rn
~bhn  ~pneh + ~whn:
Since e^hn  eh; it holds that 0 2 h(~pn; xhn) by A4.5. By A4.4 it holds that
b^hn = 
h
n
~bhn + (1  hn)0 2 h(~pn; hnxhn + (1  hn)e^hn) = h(~pn; x^hn):
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It follows that (x^hn; b^
h
n) 2 ~h(~pn; rn; zn; zn; ~whn): Using (xhn;~bhn) ! (xh;~bh) and ~pxh + r~bh =
~peh + ~wh;
~pne
h + ~whn   ~pne^hn
~pnxhn + rn
~bhn   ~pne^hn
! ~pe
h + ~wh   ~pe^h
~pxh + r~bh   ~pe^h = 1
and so hn ! 1: Consequently, x^hn ! e^h+(xh e^h) = xh and b^hn ! ~bh: Lower hemi-continuity
of ~h follows.
Let (~pn; rn; zn; zn; ~w
h
n)n2N be a sequence of points in RLS+ RS+ RLS+ RLS+ R+ con-
verging to (~p; r; z; z; ~wh): For n 2 N; let (xhn;~bhn) be an element of ~h(~p; r; z; z; ~wh) converging
to (xh;~bh): The correspondence ~h is closed at (~p; r; z; z; ~wh) if (xh;~bh) 2 ~h(~p; r; z; z; ~wh):
Since Xh is closed by A1, it holds that (xh;~bh) 2 Xh  RS: Since h is closed by A4.1,
we have ~bh 2 h(~p; xh): The usual continuity arguments imply that z  xh   eh  z; and
~pxh + r~bh  ~peh + ~wh: It follows that (xh;~bh) 2 ~h(~p; r; z; z; ~wh): 2
The assumptions in Lemma 4.1 are such that for every household there is a consumption
bundle in the budget set which is strictly less expensive than the household's total income.
This cheaper point assumption is well-known in general equilibrium theory, see Debreu
(1959), and crucial to show lower hemi-continuity of the budget correspondence. A similar
assumption is made in Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.2 The correspondence ^h is lower hemi-continuous and closed at any
(p; q; r; z; z; vh) 2 RLS+  Q RLS+  RLS+  RS+ satisfying ~pz < 0 or ~qvh > 0:
Proof: Let (pn; qn; rn; zn; zn; v
h
n)n2N be a sequence of points in RLS+  Q   RLS+ 
RLS+ RS+ converging to (p; q; r; z; z; vh): Let (xh; ah; bh) be an element of ^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh):
The correspondence ^h is lower hemi-continuous at (p; q; r; z; z; vh) if there is a sequence
(xhn; a
h
n; b
h
n)n2N such that (x
h
n; a
h
n; b
h
n) 2 ^h(pn; qn; rn; zn; zn; vhn) and (xhn; ahn; bhn)! (xh; ah; bh):
For st 2 S; we dene ~qst = q0st=(1 + rst); ~pst = ~qstpst ; ~bhst = ~qstbhst ; ~vhst = ~qstvhst ; and
~whst =
P
st2S ~v
h
st :
We consider two cases, 1. ~pxh + r~bh < ~peh + ~wh and 2. ~pxh + r~bh = ~peh + ~wh; [~pz < 0
or ~wh > 0]:
Case 1. ~pxh + r~bh < ~peh + ~wh:
We dene the sequence (xhn)n2N as in Case 1 of Lemma 4.1. It holds that x
h
n 2 Xh;
zn  xhn eh  zn; and xhn ! xh: Since h is lower hemi-continuous, there exists a sequence
(bhn)n2N such that b
h
n 2 h(pn; xhn) and bhn ! bh: Moreover, ~pnxhn+ rn~bhn  ~pneh  ~whn ! ~pxh+
r~bh  ~peh  ~wh < 0: Therefore, for n suciently large, ~pnxhn+rn~bhn  ~pneh  ~whn < 0:We dene
ahn by means of the recursive system of equations (4:2) as determined by (pn; qn; rn; v
h
n) and
(xhn; b
h
n): It is straightforward to demonstrate that a
h
n ! ah: Clearly, for n suciently large,
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(xhn; a
h
n; b
h
n) 2 ^h(pn; qn; rn; zn; zn; vhn) and lower hemi-continuity of ^h follows.
Case 2. ~pxh + ~rbh = ~peh + ~wh; [~pz < 0 or ~wh > 0]:
Consider the sequence (xhn; a
h
n; b
h
n)n2N as dened in Case 1 and the sequence (e^
h
n)n2N as
dened in Case 2 of Lemma 4.1. For n 2 N; for st 2 S; we dene ~bhst;n = ~qst;nbhst;n: If
~pnx
h
n + rn
~bhn > ~pne
h + ~whn; then dene 
h
n by
hn =
~pne
h + ~whn   ~pne^hn
~pnxhn + rn
~bhn   ~pne^hn
(4.6)
and if ~pnx
h
n+rn
~bhn  ~pneh+ ~whn; then dene hn = 1: Next, we dene x^hn = e^hn+hn(xhn e^hn) and
b^hn = 
h
nb
h
n: We dene a^
h
n by means of the recursive system of equations (4.2) as determined
by (pn; qn; rn; v
h
n) and (x^
h
n; b^
h
n):
By exactly the same arguments as in the proof of Case 1 of Lemma 4.1 it follows that
(x^hn; a^
h
n; b^
h
n) 2 ^h(pn; qn; rn; zn; zn; vhn) and (x^hn; a^hn; b^hn)! (xh; ah; bh): Lower hemi-continuity
of ^h follows.
Let (pn; qn; rn; zn; zn; v
h
n)n2N be a sequence of points in RLS+  Q   RLS+  RLS+  RS+
converging to (p; q; r; z; z; vh): For n 2 N; let (xhn; ahn; bhn) be an element of ^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh)
converging to (xh; ah; bh): The correspondence ^h is closed at (p; q; r; z; z; vh) if (xh; ah; bh) 2
^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh): Since Xh is closed by A1, it holds that (xh; ah; bh) 2 Xh  RS+  RS:
Since h is closed by A4.1, we have bh 2 h(p; x): The usual continuity arguments imply
that
z  xh   eh  z;
~pxh + ~rbh  ~peh + ~qvh;
ahsT+1 = p
 
sT+1
(xh
s T+1
  eh
s T+1
) + rs T+1
bh
s T+1
  vh
s T+1
; sT+1 2 ST+1;
ahst = p
 
st(x
h
s t
  eh
s t
) + rs t b
h
s t
  vh
s t
+
P
st+12s+t qst+1a
h
st+1
; st 2 S n fs0g:
It follows that (xh; ah; bh) 2 ^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh): 2
5 Parametrized Prices and Rationing Schemes
We will not only establish that sticky price equilibria exist, but also that there is an
abundance of such equilibria. In fact, we will argue that the set of sticky price equilibria is
jST j-dimensional. To prove this result, it is convenient to choose a suitable parametrization
of price and rationing variables. For `st 2 L S; we dene the set of parameters R`st by
R`st = R+; if st 2 Na` ;
R`st = [0; 1]; if st 2 N s` ;
with typical element `st : Next, we dene R =
Q
`st2LS R`st with typical element :
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When st 2 Na` ; supply and demand are equilibrated by the price p`st 2 R+: We
parametrize this price by the variable `st 2 R+ and set p`st() = `st :
At st in N
s
` ; the market for commodity ` is equilibrated by one-sided rationing. We
will parametrize the relevant rationing schemes by a single parameter `st 2 [0; 1]: We
dene z`st() and z`st() in such a way that the following properties hold: z`st() = 0 if
`st = 0; at equilibrium  may lead to supply rationing in market for commodity `st only
if `st < 1=2; but is irrelevant for supply rationing when `st  1=2: Similarly, z`st() = 0
if `st = 1; at equilibrium `st may lead to demand rationing in market for commodity `st
only if `st > 1=2; but is irrelevant for demand rationing when `st  1=2: The rationing
scheme on supply induced by  is more negative, so less restrictive for choice, when `st
increases; the induced rationing scheme on demand is less positive, so more restrictive when
`st increases. In this way `st clears markets by means of rationing in a way analogously
to a price variable. Low values of `st tend to induce excess demand and high values of
`st tend to induce excess supply, completely analogous to the response of excess demand
to the price of a commodity.
We now make the parametrization explicit. Since consumption sets are bounded from
below, the market clearing conditions imply that the set of attainable allocations of con-
sumption bundles, the set of x 2Qh2H Xh such thatPh2H xh =Ph2H eh; is bounded. Let
c 2 RLS+ be such that at every attainable allocation the excess consumption xh`st eh`st of ev-
ery household h is strictly less than c`st and strictly more than  c`st : Moreover, we choose
c  Ph2H(eh   xh); where xh is a lower bound for Xh; which implies that consumption
equal to c`st by a single household is not compatible with feasibility of the allocation.
We dene, for ` 2 L; for st 2 Na` ;
p`st() = `st ;
z`st() =  c`st ;
z`st() = c`st ;
for st 2 N s` ;
p`st() = p`s t ();
z`st() = maxf 2c`st`st ; c`stg;
z`st() = minf2c`st   2c`st`st ; c`stg:
In case s0 2 N s` ; the above denition should be read as requiring p`s 0 () = p`s 1 :
Notice that this recursive denition implies p`st0 () = `st(st0 ); where `st0 is a commodity
with a sticky price, t is the date where this price is set, and st(st0) the prevailing date-event.
In case t =  1 it holds that p`st0 () = p`s 1 : An important observation is that for each
commodity `st there is exactly one instrument, parametrized by `st ; to clear its market,
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either a price, or a rationing scheme on supply, or a rationing scheme on demand.
Definition 5.1A parametrized sticky price equilibrium for the economy E is (; q; v; x; a; b)
in R RS+  RHS  RHLS  RHS+  RHS such that
(a) for h 2 H; (xh; ah; bh) is h-maximal on h(p(); q; r; z(); z(); vh);
(b) commodity markets clear,
P
h2H x
h =
P
h2H e
h;
(c) Arrow security markets clear,
P
h2H a
h = 0;
(d) the no-arbitrage conditions hold, for st 2 S;
P
st+12s+t q

st+1
= 1=(1 + rst);
(e) for h 2 H; for st 2 S; dividends satisfy vhst = hrst
P
h2H b
h
st :
The notion of parametrized sticky price equilibrium is more convenient than the one
of sticky price equilibrium for a number of reasons. The number of free variables in a
parametrized sticky price equilibrium is less than the number in a sticky price equilibrium
and is equal to the number of market clearing conditions. None of the equilibrium con-
ditions in a parametrized sticky price equilibrium involves conditionals. All the variables
in a parametrized sticky price equilibrium are real numbers; extended real numbers are
avoided.
The next result shows that a parametrized sticky price equilibrium induces a sticky price
equilibrium in a straightforward way. In fact, all that we need to do is to replace supply
rationing schemes that are equal to the lower bound  c`st by  1 and demand rationing
schemes equal to the upper bound c`st by +1: To this end, we dene z1`st() = z`st() if
z`st() >  c`st and z1`st() =  1 if z`st() =  c`st ; and z1`st() = z`st() if z`st() < c`st
and z1`st() = +1 if z`st() = c`st :
Theorem 5.2 If (; q; v; x; a; b) is a parametrized sticky price equilibrium, then
(p(); q; z1(); z1(); v; x; a; b) is a sticky price equilibrium.
Proof: We verify that (p(); q; z1(); z1(); v; x; a; b) satises Conditions (a){
(h) of Denition 2.1.
To show (a), it is sucient to show that replacing a rationing scheme on supply equal
to  c`st by  1 and a rationing scheme on demand equal to c`st by +1 is not going to give
opportunities to any household h to acquire (xh; ah; bh) 2 h(p(); q; z1(); z1(); vh)
such that xh h xh: Suppose, on the contrary, there is such a household h and a corre-
sponding (xh; ah; bh): Since x is an attainable consumption bundle, it holds that  c 
xh  eh  c: It follows that  c (xh  eh)+ (1 )(xh  eh) c for  strictly positive
and suciently close to zero, and therefore z()  (xh  eh) + (1  )(xh  eh)  z():
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Since h(p(); q; r; z1(); z1(); vh) is convex, we nd that (xh + (1   )xh; ah +
(1 )ah; bh+(1 )bh; vh) 2 h(p(); q; r; z(); z()): By convexity of h we have
that xh h xh + (1   )xh; which contradicts that (xh; ah; bh) is h-maximal on
h(p(); q; r; z(); z(); vh):
Conditions (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) hold trivially.
For st 2 Na` ; z`st() =  c`st and z`st() = c`st ; so z1`st() =  1 and z1`st() = +1;
and we obtain Condition (g).
By denition, for any value of  2 R; it is not the case that simultaneously z`st() >
 c`st and z`st() < c`st ; and therefore it is not the case that simultaneously z1`st() >  1
and z1`st() < +1: This proves that Condition (h) is satised. 2
By Theorem 5.2, if we show that parametrized sticky price equilibria exist, we have
shown the existence of sticky price equilibria. Theorem 5.3 shows the converse of Theo-
rem 5.2. Up to irrelevant values of non-binding rationing schemes, all sticky price equilibria
are obtained when restricting attention to parametrized sticky price equilibria.
Theorem 5.3 If (p; q; z; z; v; x; a; b) is a sticky price equilibrium, then (; q; v; x; a; b)
is a parametrized sticky price equilibrium, where for st 2 Na` ;
`st = p

`st ;
and for st 2 N s` ;
if z`st <  c`st and z`st > c`st ; then `st = 1=2;
if z`st   c`st ; then `st = z`st=  2c`st ;
if z`st  c`st ; then `st = (2c`st   z`st)=2c`st :
Proof: We show that (; q; v; x; a; b) satises all the conditions of a parametrized
sticky price equilibrium.
Condition (a) follows since
(xh; ah; bh) 2 h(p(); q; r; z(); z(); vh)  h(p; q; r; z; z; vh):
Conditions (b), (c), (d), and (e) hold trivially. 2
Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 imply that there is no loss of generality to restrict attention to
parametrized sticky price equilibria.
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6 Multiplicity of Sticky Price Equilibria
We show that the degree of multiplicity of sticky price equilibria is jST j by showing that
parametrized sticky price equilibria exist that satisfy jST j additional restrictions on top
of the equilibrium conditions. To make our formulation as simple as possible, we assume
that at every terminal date-event sT 2 ST there is at least one commodity with a exible
price. We select for each date-event sT one such commodity, denoted by `(sT )sT ; and
dene the set of those commodities by L = f`(sT )sT j sT 2 STg: The jST j additional
restrictions are formulated by choosing an arbitrary vector  2 RST++ and imposing, for
sT 2 ST ; `(sT )sT = sT on top of the equilibrium conditions. The additional restrictions
pin down the nominal prices of jST j commodities.
Theorem 6.1 For all sT 2 ST ; assume sT 2 [`2LNa` : Let L be a set with one exible
price commodity for each terminal date-event. For each choice of  2 RST++; there is a
parametrized sticky price equilibrium (; q; v; x; a; b) satisfying, for all `sT 2 L; `sT =
sT :
Proof:
Step 1. Compactication.
Fix some u  maxf1;maxsT2ST sT ;max`2L p`s 1g: For `st 2 (LS) nL; we dene R`st =
R`st \ [0; u] and R =
Q
`st2(LS)nL
R`st  fg: Since u  1; the denition of R imposes no
restrictions on `st when st 2 N s` : Since u  maxsT2ST sT and u  max`2L p`s 1 ; we have
that p( R)  [0; uS]; where uS 2 RS is the vector with all components equal to u:
For h 2 H; we dene the compact set
Xh = fxh 2 Xh j xh   eh  cg:
Choose fh and fh as in A4. Since [0; uS] Xh is compact and fh and fh are continuous,
[h2Hfh([0; uS]  Xh) and [h2H fh([0; uS]  Xh) are compact. Let b  2 RS be a lower
bound for the former and b+ 2 RS be an upper bound for the latter set. We dene
Bh = fbh 2 RS j b   bh  b+g; h 2 H;
V c = fv 2 RS+ j 8st 2 S; vst  rst
P
h2H b
+
stg;
V h = V c; h 2 H:
For h 2 H; for st 2 S; we dene Ahst recursively as a compact, convex set containing all
ah
s+t
2 Rs+t such that (4.2) is satised for some p 2 [0; uS]; (q; r) 2 Q; vh 2 V h; xh 2 Xh;
ah
(s+t )
+ 2 Ahs+t ; and b
h 2 Bh: Next, we dene Ah =Qst2S Ahst :
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Step 2. Formulation of the xed point correspondence.
For `st 2 (L S) n L; we dene
`st(x) = f`st 2 R`st j `st
X
h2H
(xh`st   eh`st)  `st
X
h2H
(xh`st   eh`st) for all `st 2 R`stg:
We dene the correspondence  : X ! R by setting (x) =Q`st2(LS)nL `st(x) fg:
For st 2 S; we dene Qst = fqs+t 2 R
s+t
+ j
P
st+12s+t qst+1 = 1=(1 + rst)g and the
correspondence st : Ast ! Qst by
st(as+t ) = fqs+t 2 Qst j qs+t
X
h2H
ah
s+t
 qs+t
X
h2H
ah
s+t
g; as+t 2 Ast :
For h 2 H; we dene the (single-valued) correspondence oh : Bh ! V h by
ohst(b
h) = fhrst
X
h02H
bh
0
stg; st 2 S:
We dene the correspondence h : RQ V h ! Xh  Ah Bh by
h(; q; vh) = ^h(p(); q; r; z(); z(); vh)\ (XhAhBh); (; q; vh) 2 RQ V h:
The construction of the functions z and z guarantees that any consumption bundle in
^h(p(); q; r; z(); z(); vh) belongs to Xh: The construction of Bh ensures that any h-
optimal consumption bundle in ^h(p(); q; r; z(); z(); vh) can be purchased by means of
bank loans in Bh: Finally, the choice of Ah is such that any pair consisting of a consumption
bundle in ^h(p(); q; r; z(); z(); vh) and a bank loan in Bh can be nanced by asset market
transactions in Ah:
For all q 2 Q; there is sT 2 ST such that q0sT > 0 and therefore
q0sT
1 + rsT
p`(sT )sT () =
q0sT
1 + rsT
sT > 0;
so X
st2S
q0st
1 + rst
pst()zst()   
q0sT
1 + rsT
sT c`(sT )sT < 0;
and it follows by Lemma 4.2 that ^h is lower hemi-continuous at any (p(); q; r; z(); z(); vh)
with (; q; vh) 2 RQV h: For all (; q; vh) 2 RQV h; int(^h(p(); q; r; z(); z(); vh))\
int(Xh  Ah  Bh) 6= ;; so it follows from Hildenbrand (1974), Problem 6, p. 35, that h
is lower hemi-continuous. Since XhAhBh is compact, and ^h is closed by Lemma 4.2,
we have that h has a closed graph, so is upper hemi-continuous. We dene h(; q; vh) as
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the set of h-maximal elements on h(; q; vh): An application of the maximum theorem
demonstrates that h is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
Consider the correspondence ' : RQ V  X AB ! RQ V  X AB
dened by
'(; q; v; x; a; b) = (x)(a)o(b)(; q; v); (; q; v; x; a; b) 2 RQV  XAB;
where all correspondences involved in the denition of ' are dened as the obvious prod-
ucts.
Step 3. Existence of a xed point.
Since the domain of ' is a non-empty, compact, and convex set, and ' is an upper
hemi-continuous convex-valued correspondence, all conditions of Kakutani's xed point
theorem are satised. The correspondence ' has a xed point (; q; v; x; a; b) 2
(x)  (a)  o(b)  (; q; v): We dene p = p(); z = z(); z = z(); and
z = x   e: Moreover, we dene present-value prices ~q; ~p; ~b; ~v; and ~w by setting, for
st 2 S; ~qst = q0st =(1 + rst); ~pst = ~qstpst ; ~bst = ~qstbst ; ~vst = ~qstvst ; and ~w =
P
st2S ~v

st :
It holds by denition of the various correspondences involved that
1. for every h 2 H; (xh; ah; bh) 2 h(; q; vh);
2. for every st 2 S;
P
st+12s+t q

st+1
= 1=(1 + rst);
3. for every h 2 H; st 2 S; vhst = hrst
P
h02H b
h0
st ;
4. for every sT 2 ST ; `(sT )sT = sT :
By summing the equalities in 3. over all households, we obtain
for every st 2 S;
X
h2H
vhst = rst
X
h2H
bhst : (6.1)
Notice that (xh; ah; bh) 2 h(; q; vh) implies (xh; ah; bh) ish-maximal on h(; q; vh) =
^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh)\ (XhAhBh): As argued before, the construction of Ah and Bh
now implies that
for every h 2 H; (xh; ah; bh) is h  maximal on ^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh): (6.2)
Step 4. Properties of the xed point: commodities not in L:
Consider `st 2 (LS)nL: Suppose
P
h2H z
h
`st
< 0: By denition of `st ; we have 

`st
= 0;
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so p`st = 0 if st 2 Na` and z`st = 0 if st 2 N s` : In the latter case, xh`st  eh`st + z`st = eh`st for
all h 2 H by denition of h; so Ph2H zh`st  0; leading to a contradiction. In the former
case, it holds that z`st = c`st since st 2 Na` : By A2 and A4.6 it holds that xh`st = eh`st + c`st
for all h 2 H; which implies Ph2H zh`st > 0; leading to a contradiction. Consequently,
for every `st 2 (L S) n L;
X
h2H
zh`st  0:
Consider `st 2 (L  S) n L: Suppose
P
h2H z
h
`st
> 0: By denition of `st ; we have
`st = u if st 2 Na` and `st = 1 if st 2 N s` : In the latter case, xh`st  eh`st + z`st = eh`st for
all h 2 H by denition of h; so Ph2H zh`st  0; leading to a contradiction. In the former
case, p`st = u: Consequently,
for every `st 2 L S; st 2 N s` ;
X
h2H
zh`st = 0; (6.3)
for every `st 2 (L S) n L such that st 2 Na` ;
P
h2H z
h
`st
 0;P
h2H z
h
`st
> 0) p`st = u:
(6.4)
Step 5. Properties of the xed point: commodity prices.
Consider `st 2 (LS)nL such that st 2 Na` : Suppose p`st = 0: Then we have
P
h2H z
h
`st
> 0
since z`st = c`st by denition of z and x
h
`st
= eh`st + c`st by A2 and A4.6. By (6.4) it holds
that p`st = u; leading to a contradiction. Consequently,
for every `st 2 (L S) n L such that st 2 Na` ; p`st > 0:
Now it holds that
p  0; (6.5)
since the price of a commodity `sT 2 L is equal to sT > 0 and the price of a commodity
`st0 with a sticky price is set in previous date-event st(st0); so p

`st0
= p`st(st0 ) > 0: This
argument makes use of the fact that ps 1  0 by A6 in case t =  1:
Step 6. Properties of the xed point: assets.
We now prove by induction that
for every st 2 S+;
X
h2H
ahst  0:
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By denition of h we have q
s+0
ah
s+0
 0: Let 1s+0s1 denote the s1-th unit vector in Rs+0 : It
holds that
0  q
s+0
X
h2H
ah
s+0
 1
1 + rs0
1s
+
0
s1
X
h2H
ah
s+0
=
1
1 + rs0
X
h2H
ahs1 ;
where the second inequality follows by denition of s0 :We have shown that for all s1 2 s+0 ;P
h2H a
h
s1
 0; or equivalently Ph2H ahs+0  0:
We show next that if, for some t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg; for some st 2 St;
P
h2H a
h
st  0; then for
all st+1 2 s+t ;
P
h2H a
h
st+1
 0; or equivalently Ph2H ahs+t  0: By denition of h we haveX
h2H
q
s+t
ah
s+t
=
X
h2H
(ahst   ps t z
h
s t
  rs t b
h
s t
+ vh
s t
)  0;
where we use the induction hypothesis, the fact that p
s t
P
h2H z
h
s t
 0 by (6.3) and (6.4),
and (6.1). By denition of st it holds that
0  q
s+t
X
h2H
ah
s+t
 1
1 + rst
1s
+
t
st+1
X
h2H
ah
s+t
=
1
1 + rst
X
h2H
ahst+1 ; st+1 2 s+t ;
so
P
h2H a
h
s+t
 0: This completes the induction step.
Step 7. Properties of the xed point: commodities in L:
Consider sT 2 ST : It holds that
psT
X
h2H
zhsT =
X
h2H
ah
s+T
 
X
h2H
(rsT b
h
sT
  vhsT ) =
X
h2H
ah
s+T
 0;
where the rst equality follows from the denition of h and the second equality from (6.1).
By (6.3), (6.4), and (6.5) we have the following result,
for every sT 2 ST ;
X
h2H
zh`(sT )sT  0: (6.6)
Step 8. Properties of the xed point: asset prices.
For sT+1 2 ST+1 we have qsT+1 = 1=(1+ rsT+1) > 0: Suppose qst = 0 for some st 2 S n fs0g:
Let sT be a period T successor of st: Then ~p

sT
= ~qsT p

sT
= 0; so by the by now familiar
argument, xh`(sT )sT = e
h
`(sT )sT
+ c`(sT )sT for all h 2 H; leading to a contradiction to (6.6).
We have shown that
q  0: (6.7)
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Step 9. Properties of the xed point: optimality of choices.
Consider ` 2 L and sT 2 Na` : For all h 2 H we have that
eh`sT + z

`sT
= eh`sT + c`sT
 eh`sT +
P
h02H(e
h0
`sT
  xh0`sT )
 eh`sT +
P
h02H(x
h0
`sT
  xh0`sT )
= xh`sT +
P
h02Hnfhg(x
h0
`sT
  xh0`sT ) + (eh`sT   xh`sT )
> xh`sT ;
(6.8)
where the rst equality uses sT 2 Na` ; the rst inequality uses the denition of c`sT ; the
second inequality uses (6.6), and the nal inequality uses A1 and the denition of xh:
Suppose, for some h 2 H; ~pxh + r~bh < ~peh + ~wh: Consider a sequence (xhn)n2N of
points in Xh such that xhn converges to x
h; xh`sT ;n > x
h
`sT
if sT 2 Na` ; and xh`st;n = xh`st
otherwise. Inequality (6.8) guarantees that xhn   eh  z for n suciently large. Since
h is lower hemi-continuous, there exists a sequence (bhn)n2N of points in 
h(p; xhn) such
that bhn ! bh: For n suciently large it holds that ~pxhn + r~bhn < ~peh + ~wh; and one
can therefore choose ahn 2 RS+ such that (xhn; ahn; bhn) 2 ^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh): Since h
is monotonic, this contradicts that (xh; ah; bh) is h-maximal on ^h(p; q; r; z; z; vh):
Consequently,
for every h 2 H; ~pxh + r~bh = ~peh + ~wh; (6.9)
and using (6.2) it follows that
for every h 2 H; (xh; ah; bh) is h -maximal on h(p; q; r; z; z; vh);
so (a) of Denition 5.1 holds.
Step 10. Lifting the upper bound on prices.
Let (un)n2N be a sequence of points such that un  maxf1;maxsT2ST sT ;max`2L p`s 1g
and un ! 1: Let Rn; An; Bn; and Vn denote the corresponding compactied sets of
endogenous variables as constructed in Step 1 and let ('n)n2N be a sequence of xed point
correspondences as constructed in Step 2. Let (n; q

n; v

n; x

n; a

n; b

n)n2N be a corresponding
sequence of xed points, whose existence is shown in Step 3. For n 2 N; we dene pn =
p(n); z

n = z(

n); z

n = z(

n); and z

n = x

n   e: Moreover, we dene the present-value
variables ~qn; ~p

n;
~bn; ~v

n; and ~w

n by setting, for st 2 S; ~qst;n = q0st;n=(1+rst); ~pst;n = ~qst;npst;n;
~bst;n = ~q

st;nb

st;n; ~v

st;n = ~q

st;nv

st;n; and ~w

n =
P
st2S ~v

st;n:
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Suppose for every n 2 N there is `st 2 L S such that
P
h2H z
h
`st;n
> 0: We will derive
a contradiction in Steps 11-13.
Step 11. Construction of a convergent subsequence.
For every n 2 N; for every h 2 H; let bhn be a minimal element of h(pn; xhn ); so there is
no bh 2 h(pn; xhn ) with bh < bhn: Since h is closed by A4.1, such a bhn exists. We dene ~bhn
by setting ~bhst;n = ~q

st;nb
h
st;n for st 2 S: We have
for every n 2 N; for every h 2 H; r~bhn = r~bhn ; (6.10)
since it clearly holds that r~bhn  r~bhn ; whereas a strict inequality would lead to a contra-
diction as in the proof of inequality (6.7).
We divide ~pn; ~bn; ~v

n; and ~w

n by k~pnk1 and denote the resulting variables by p^n; b^n;
v^n; and w^n: We claim that these variables are bounded. It is obvious that the sequence
(p^n)n2N is bounded.
We show next that the sequence (b^n)n2N is bounded and start by showing that this
sequence is bounded from below. We have that bhn 2 h(pn; xhn ) and fh(pn; xhn )  bhn:
By the homogeneity as stated in A4.3, it holds that b^hn 2 h(p^n; xhn ): By A4.2 it holds
that fh(p^n; x
h
n )  b^hn: We dene P = fp 2 RLS+ j kpk1 = 1g: Since the set P  Xh is
compact and fh is continuous, the set fh(P  Xh) is compact, so bounded from below. It
follows that the sequence (b^n)n2N is bounded from below. To show that this sequence is
bounded from above, we show rst that b^hn  fh(p^n; xhn ): Suppose not, then by A4.2 we
have b^hn = minf fh(p^n; xhn ); b^hng 2 h(p^n; xhn ) and b^hn < b^hn: We dene bhn 2 RS by setting
bhst;n =
k~pnk1
~qst;n
b^hst;n; st 2 S:
Notice that ~qst;n > 0 by (6.7), so b
h
n is well-dened. Then it holds by A4.3 that b
h
n 2
h(pn; x
h
n ); whereas b
h
n < b
h
n; a contradiction to the choice of b
h
n: Consequently, it holds
that b^hn  fh(p^n; xhn ): Since the set P  Xh is compact and fh is continuous, the set
fh(P  Xh) is compact, so bounded from above. It follows that the sequence (b^n)n2N is
bounded from above.
Since, by (6.10), for st 2 S; v^hst;n = hrst
P
h02H b^
h0
st;n; and (b^n)n2N is bounded, it follows
that the sequence (v^n)n2N is bounded. Next, since w^h =
P
st2S v^
h
st ; it follows that the
sequence (w^n)n2N is bounded.
The boundedness of the various sequences of endogenous variables implies that, with-
out loss of generality, (p^n; ~q

n; z

n; z

n; w^n; x

n; b^n) is a convergent sequence with limit, say,
(p^; ~q; z; z; w^; x; b^): Moreover, without loss of generality, there is `st 2 L  S such that
for all n 2 N; zh`st;n > 0: By (6.4) we have that st 2 Na` and p`st;n = un:
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Step 12. Continuity of demand at the limit.
We argue next that p^z < 0: We achieve this by showing that there is a commodity `st
such that st 2 Na` and p^`st > 0:
Consider `st0 2 L  S such that p^`st0 = 1: If st0 2 Na` ; then we are done. If st0 2 N s` ;
then let st be the date-event where the price of `st0 is set. If t  0; then st 2 Na` and
p^`st = lim
n!1
p^`st;n  lim
n!1
p^`st0 ;n = p^`st0 = 1;
where the inequality uses the fact that p`st;n = p

`st0 ;n
and ~q`st;n  ~q`st0 ;n: It follows that
p^`st = 1: If t =  1; then
p^`st0 = limn!1
~p`st0 ;n
k~pnk1
= lim
n!1
~qst0 ;np

`st0 ;n
k~pnk1
= lim
n!1
~qst0 ;np`s 1
k~pnk1
= 1;
so limn!1 k~pnk1 = ~qst0p`s 1 : Let sT be a date-event such that ~qsT > 0: Then, for every
n 2 N;
k~pnk1  ~qsT ;np`(sT )sT = ~qsT ;nsT ;
so ~qst0p`s 1 = limn!1 k~pnk1  ~qsTsT > 0 and
p^`(sT )sT =
~qsTsT
~qst0p`s 1
> 0:
Since sT 2 Na`(sT ); we have shown that p^z < 0:
Let h be the set of all points in the sequence (p^n; r; z

n; z

n; w^
h
n)n2N and its limit (p^; r; z
; z; w^h):
Let Bh be a compact set containing all the points in the sequence (b^hn)n2N and its limit (b^
h)
in its interior. We dene h : h ! XhBh by h(h) = ~h(h)\( Xh\Bh): Since ~h is lower
hemi-continuous on h by Lemma 4.1 and for all h 2 h; int(~h(h)) \ int( Xh \Bh) 6= ;;
it follows from Hildenbrand (1974), Problem 6, p. 35, that h is lower hemi-continuous.
Since Xh  Bh is compact and ~h is closed by Lemma 4.1, we have that h has a closed
graph, so is upper hemi-continuous. We dene h : h ! Xh  Bh by dening h(h)
as the set of h-maximal elements on h(h): An application of the maximum theorem
demonstrates that h is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
Step 13. Deriving a contradiction.
Since for n 2 N; (xhn ; b^hn) 2 h(p^n; r; zn; zn; w^hn)n2N; it follows by upper hemi-continuity of
h that (xh; b^h) 2 h(p^; r; z; z; w^h):
Consider `st 2 L  S such that for all n 2 N; p`st;n = un and let sT be a successor
of st in period T or equal to st in case t = T: We show that p^`(sT )sT = 0: First, consider
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the case where ~qst = 0: Then it holds that ~q

sT
= 0 and p`(sT )sT = sT : Moreover, k~pnk1 is
bounded away from zero, since k~pnk1  ~qsT ;nsT ! ~qsTsT > 0; where sT is chosen such
that ~qsT > 0: We therefore have that
p^`(sT )sT = limn!1
p^`(sT )sT ;n = limn!1
~qsT ;np

`(sT )sT ;n
k~pnk1
= 0:
Second, consider the case where ~qst > 0: Since p

`st;n
= un; it follows that ~p

`st;n
=
~qst;np

`st;n
!1 as n!1; so k~pnk1 !1 as n!1: We therefore have that
p^`(sT )sT = limn!1
p^`(sT )sT ;n = limn!1
~qsT ;np

`(sT )sT ;n
k~pnk1
=
~qsTsT
limn!1 k~pnk1
= 0:
Consider (xh; bh) 2 h(p^; r; z; z; w^h): Since p^`(sT )sT = 0; we have that
xh`(sT )sT = e
h
`(sT )sT
+ z`(sT )sT = e
h
`(sT )sT
+ c`(sT )sT :
Since h is upper hemi-continuous at (p^; r; z; z; w^h); we have thatX
h2H
zh`(sT )sT ;n !
X
h2H
c`(sT )sT > 0;
a contradiction to (6.6).
Step 14. Market clearing for commodities.
We have shown that there is n 2 N such that for every `st 2 L  S;
P
h2H z
h
`st;n
 0: We
x such an n; and omit it from the notation. Suppose
P
h2H z
h < 0: It holds that
~p
X
h2H
zh < 0;
where the inequality uses (6.5) and (6.7). At the same time, we have by (6.9) and (6.1)
that
~p
P
h2H z
h = r
P
h2H ~b
h   ~wh
=
P
st2S ~q

st(rst
P
h2H b
h  Ph2H vh) = 0:
We have derived a contradiction. Consequently, it holds that
P
h2H x
h =
P
h2H e
h and
we have shown (b) of Denition 5.1.
Step 15. Market clearing for assets.
We use induction to show (c) of Denition 5.1. For every sT+1 2 ST+1; by denition of h;
h 2 H;X
h2H
ahsT+1 = p

s T+1
X
h2H
(xh
s T+1
  eh
s T+1
) + rs T+1
X
h2H
bh
s T+1
 
X
h2H
vh
s T+1
= 0;
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where the last equality uses (b) of Denition 5.1 and (6.1).
Assume, for some t 2 f0; : : : ; Tg; we have shown that for every st+1 2 St+1;
P
h2H a
h
st+1
=
0: For every st 2 St; by denition of h; h 2 H;X
h2H
ahst = p

s t
X
h2H
(xh
s t
  eh
s t
) + rs t
X
h2H
bh
s t
 
X
h2H
vh
s t
+
X
st+12s+t
qst+1
X
h2H
ahst+1 = 0;
where the last equality uses (b) of Denition 5.1, (6.1), and the induction hypothesis. This
completes the proof of Theorem 6.1. 2
By Theorem 5.2 the following corollary follows at once.
Corollary 6.2 For all sT 2 ST ; assume sT 2 [`2LNa` : Let L be a set with one exi-
ble price commodity for each terminal date-event. For each choice of  2 RST++; there is
a sticky price equilibrium (p; q; z; z; v; x; a; b) satisfying, for all `sT 2 L; p`sT = sT :
What is the intuition underlying the results of Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.2? Count-
ing equations and unknowns in Denition 5.1 of a parametrized sticky price equilibrium
reveals that there are jLjjSj commodity market clearing conditions and jLjjSj variables
`st : Moreover, there are jS+j asset market clearing conditions and jS+j asset prices qst :
There are jSj+ jST j budget constraints in (2.1), leading to jSj+ jST jWalras' laws, inducing
jSj + jST j degrees of freedom for equilibrium. The policy of the bank involves setting jSj
interest rates, leading to jSj no-arbitrage conditions in Denition 5.1, reducing the degrees
of freedom for equilibrium by jSj; resulting in jST j degrees of indeterminacy.
One way to lift the jST j degrees of indeterminacy has been been suggested by Magill
and Quinzii (2010) in a model without price stickiness. Their suggestion essentially boils
down to choosing jST j additional instruments, in their case by having the bank not only
controlling the short-term interest rates, but in addition the interest rates on bonds with
longer maturity. Although it is not completely evident that the needed controllability
requirements carry over to the sticky price framework, the general principle that more
instruments are needed to lower the degree of indeterminacy holds. But since the number
jST j should be thought of as huge, the date-event tree should in principle include all
date-events on which agents can condition their actions, the extent to which additional
instruments help to reduce nominal and real indeterminacy remains an open issue.
7 Degrees of Nominal and Real Indeterminacy
Corollary 6.2 shows that for each choice of  2 RST++ there is a sticky price equilibrium with,
for all `sT 2 L; p`sT = sT : The equilibrium nominal price level at terminal date-events is
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arbitrary, irrespective of the interest rate policy by the bank.
The case where all prices are exible has been studied in Dreze and Polemarchakis
(2001). The absence of imperfections in price formation and the homogeneity assumptions
imposed on the transactions technology imply that the whole analysis there can be done
in terms of present-value prices. Each equilibrium in terms of present-value prices leads to
an ST -dimensional set of equilibria.
To illustrate this fact, consider, for the sake of concreteness, an economy with two
periods, and let (p0s0 ; (p
0
s1
)s12S1) be present-value equilibrium prices. In terms of nominal
prices, we have that
p0s0 = ps0 ;
p0s1 = q
0
s1
ps1 = qs1ps1 ; s1 2 S1:
By the homogeneity assumption on the transactions technology, we nd that the present-
value equilibrium prices (p0s0 ; (p
0
s1
)s12S1) induce the (S1   1)-dimensional set of nominal
equilibrium prices (ps0 ; (ps1)s12S1) given by
ps0 = p
0
s0
;
ps1 =
1
qs1
p0s1 ; s1 2 S1;
whenever q 2 RS1++ satises
P
s12S1 qs1 = 1; so induces S1   1 degrees of freedom.
Whenever (ps0 ; (ps1)s12S1) are nominal equilibrium prices, so is (ps0 ; (ps1)s12S1) for
any  > 0; which adds one degree of freedom and shows that each equilibrium in terms
of present-value prices leads to an S1-dimensional set of equilibria. All these equilibria
induce the same equilibrium allocation, so there is only nominal indeterminacy and no real
indeterminacy of equilibrium in this case.
The same S1-dimensional set of equilibria results from Corollary 6.2, though the parametriza-
tion chosen there is dierent. According to Corollary 6.2, one can choose a exible price
commodity `(s1) for each date-event s1 2 S1; a vector of price levels  2 RS1++ and have an
equilibrium with nominal prices given by p`(s1) = s1 :
Although the bank cannot control the price level by interest rate policy, it can control
expected ination. To illustrate this, suppose the economy is stationary, meaning that
present-value equilibrium prices are constant up to a discount factor ;
p0s1 = s1p
0
s0
; s1 2 S1;
where s1 is the probability of occurrence of state s1: We have that the harmonic mean of
period one prices is equal to
H(pS1) =
1P
s12S1
s1
ps1
=
1P
s12S1
s1qs1
p0s1
=
1P
s12S1
qs1
ps0
=
1
1
ps0 (1+rs0 )
= ps0(1 + rs0):
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Expected ination is equal to (1 + rs0): Higher nominal interest rates lead to higher
expected ination. The variance of ination, however, can be arbitrarily high and is not
controlled by the interest rate. Whenever there are two or more date-events in period one,
arbitrarily high ination rates are caused by values of qs1 arbitrarily close to zero. Since
expected ination is controlled, high ination in some date-events has to be compensated by
low ination or even deation in other date-events, as it holds that
P
s12S qs1 = 1=(1+rs0):
This reasoning extends to the general model with T + 1 periods.
These conclusions change when the set of sticky-price commodities is non-empty. By
Corollary 6.2 there is still an ST -dimensional set of equilibria. However, the route to demon-
strate this result via proving the existence of an equilibrium in terms of present-value prices
and next generating an ST -dimensional set of nominal equilibrium prices by appropriate
choices of q and  is blocked. Multiplications of all prices by  violates price stickiness
if s0 2 [`2LN s` ; whereas it can easily happen that no choice for q is consistent with price
stickiness. The existence proof of Theorem 6.1 is therefore by means of correspondences
that are formulated in terms of nominal prices.
To illustrate the implications of Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.2, consider again an econ-
omy with two periods, one commodity per date-event, but now a sticky price in period 0,
and exible prices in period 1. By Corollary 6.2 one can choose an arbitrary vector of prices
 2 RS1++ and have an equilibrium with nominal prices given by ps1 = s1 for s1 2 S1: Since
the period 0 price is sticky, this result implies that it is not even possible to control ex-
pected ination by nominal interest rate policy. Expected ination can be arbitrarily high
or low, irrespective of nominal interest rates, as the vector  can be arbitrarily chosen.
How are markets equilibrated in such an economy? The equilibrium state prices qs1
should satisfy
P
s12S1 qs1 = 1=(1 + rs0) and, since all prices in period 1 are exible, should
be such that at equilibrium present-value prices p0s1 = qs1ps1 there is zero aggregate net
trade across future date-events. Relatively high values of s1 go together with low prices
qs1 and vice versa. When the vector  has high values across the board, with a sticky price
in period 0, the only channel to general zero intertemporal aggregate trade is demand
rationing in period 0. When expected ination is high and the price in period 0 does not
adjust, consumers will face demand rationing in period 0. Vice versa, with low expected
ination, or even expected deation, a sticky price in period 0 leads to lack of demand and
supply rationing in period 0.
In the simple case with one commodity per date-event and a sticky price in period 0,
we can generate S1   1 degrees of nominal indeterminacy by an appropriate choice of the
asset prices q in the following way. Let (p0s0 ; (p
0
s1
)s12S1) be present-value equilibrium prices.
Since the price in period 0 is assumed to be sticky, it holds that p0s0 = ps0 = ps 1 : Any
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choice of q 2 RS1++ satisfying
P
s12S1 qs1 = 1=(1 + rs0) leads to nominal equilibrium prices
ps1 =
1
qs1
p0s1 ; s1 2 S1;
at unchanged rationing schemes and allocation of commodities, thereby generating S1   1
degrees of nominal indeterminacy.
Consider a particular choice for asset prices, say q 2 RS1++ satisfying
P
s12S1 qs1 =
1=(1 + rs0); and let pS1 be the corresponding nominal commodity prices in period 1. For
any  > 0 it holds by Corollary 6.2 that there is a sticky price equilibrium with pS1 = pS1 :
Due to the requirement
P
s12S1 qs1 = 1=(1 + rs0); the present-value equilibrium prices
corresponding to dierent values of  are all distinct. Since ps0 is sticky, it also holds that
price ratios (p0s1=p
0
s0
)s12S1 are distinct for distinct values of : There is a one-dimensional
set of equilibria exhibiting real indeterminacy as an increase or a decrease of  leads on
average to overall increases or decreases in present-value prices for future commodities,
thereby aecting the budget set.
The general message, however, is that in the presence of price stickiness there are ST
degrees of real indeterminacy, so all indeterminacy is real. To show such a result, we make
the assumption that at every date-event there is at least one commodity with a sticky
price. The next result demonstrates that sticky price equilibria corresponding to dierent
choices for  have present-value prices which are not proportional to each other.
Theorem 7.1 For all st 2 S; assume st 2 [`2LN s` ; and for all sT 2 ST ; assume sT 2
[`2LNa` : Let L be a set with one exible price commodity for each terminal date-event.
Let (p; q; z; z; v; x; a; b) and (p; q; z0; z0; v; x; a;b) be sticky price equilibria such that pL = 
and pL = : If  6= ; then there is no   0 such that p0 = p0:
Proof: Assume p0 = p0 for some   0: In the sequel we make repeatedly use of the
facts shown in the proof of Theorem 6.1 that according to (6.5) p; p 0 and according to
(6.7) q; q  0:
Let ` 2 L be such that s0 2 N s` : We have that
p0`s0 = p`s0 = p`s 1 = p`s0 = p
0
`s0
:
These inequalities show that  = 1; so p0 = p0; and in particular ps0 = ps0 :
Next we prove by induction on t that for all st 2 St; pst = pst and q0st = q0st :
Consider some s1 2 S1 and let ` 2 L be such that s1 2 N s` : We have that
p0`s1 = q
0
s1
p`s1 = q
0
s1
p`s0 ;
p0`s1 = q
0
s1
p`s1 = q
0
s1
p`s0 = q
0
s1
p`s0 :
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Since p0`s1 = p
0
`s1
; the above inequalities yield q0s1 = q
0
s1
: We also have the equalities
p0s1 = q
0
s1
ps1 ;
p0s1 = q
0
s1
ps1 = q
0
s1
ps1 :
Since p0s1 = p
0
s1
; we nd that ps1 = ps1 :
Assume, for some t 2 f1; : : : ; T   1g; we have shown that pst = pst and qst = qst for
all st 2 St: We complete the proof by showing that pst+1 = pst+1 and q0st+1 = q0st+1 for all
st+1 2 St+1:
Consider some st+1 2 St+1 and let ` 2 L be such that st+1 2 N s` : We have that
p0`st+1 = q
0
st+1
p`st+1 = q
0
st+1
p`st(st+1) = qst+1q
0
st(st+1)
p`st(st+1);
p0`st+1 = q
0
st+1
p`st+1 = q
0
st+1
p`st(st+1) = qst+1 q
0
st(st+1)
p`st(st+1) = qst+1q
0
st(st+1)
p`st(st+1):
Since p0`st+1 = p
0
`st+1
; the above inequalities yield qst+1 = qst+1 ; and since q
0
st(st+1)
= q0st(st+1);
we nd that q0st+1 = q
0
st+1
: We also have the equalities
p0st+1 = q
0
st+1
pst+1 ;
p0st+1 = q
0
st+1
pst+1 = q
0
st+1
pst+1 :
Since p0st+1 = p
0
st+1
; we nd that pst+1 = pst+1 ; which completes the induction step.
It follows that  = pL = pL = ; which completes the proof. 2
8 Extensions
In a framework like ours, with multiple commodities at each date-event, there is no unique
way to dene price levels or ination. We have taken the easiest denition for the price
level, which denes the price level at a date-event to be equal to the price of an arbitrarily
chosen commodity with a exible price. A modest generalization would be to go from price
levels to \activity" levels, which would naturally be parametrized by the variable : In this
case, the arbitrarily chosen commodity might be one with a sticky price, in which case the
activity level would correspond to the amount of supply rationing or demand rationing.
This seemingly modest extension of Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.2 does not hold.
Consider for the sake of simplicity an economy with two periods, zero nominal interest
rates, a single date-event in period 1, and one commodity per date-event. Assume that
the price in period 0 is exible and the price in period 1 is sticky. Stickiness of the price in
period 1 coupled with a zero nominal interest rate, implies that the present-value price of
the future commodity is equal to the price of the current commodity. To show the existence
of a sticky price equilibrium with s1 = 1=2; we have to show existence of a sticky price
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equilibrium with no rationing in the future, and since there is a exible price in period 0,
no rationing in the present. We therefore have to show the existence of an equilibrium in
the Arrow-Debreu model where the prices of the two available commodities are equal to
each other. Generically, such an equilibrium does not exist, which proves that Theorem 6.1
and Corollary 6.2 cannot be extended in this way. Still, there is an jS1j-dimensional set of
equilibria in this example, with a xed amount of either supply or demand rationing in the
market of the commodity at date-event s1; parametrized by the price of the commodity at
date-event s0:
Rather than choosing a commodity with a exible price for each terminal date-event,
we might choose commodities with a exible price at intermediate date-events. Such an
extension can be proven by the same approach as in the proof of Theorem 6.1, with the
obvious modications.
Rather than choosing a single commodity at terminal date-events, one may dene a
price level at a terminal date-event, for instance by taking some weighted sum of the prices
at that terminal date-event. It follows immediately from Corollary 6.2 that there are sticky
price equilibria with arbitrarily high price levels at each terminal date-event.
The interest rate policy by the bank can depend on any exogenous shock as it is an
arbitrary function of date-events in S: Since the date-events in S need not be restricted
to payo relevant shocks, the interest rate policy could even depend on sunspots or be
random. Our current approach, however, does not allow the interest rate to depend on
past endogenous variables. Many papers in the macroeconomic literature have stressed
the importance of such interest rate rules, see Woodford (2003) for a detailed discussion of
this literature. Since interest rate rules are in general not compatible with the assumption
that interest rates are restricted to some compact set, such an extension poses challeng-
ing equilibrium existence issues as it is not straightforward how the endogenous variables
of the economy should be compactied. Although the equilibrium existence problem is
challenging with interest rate rules, there is no reason to expect that the jST j-dimensional
multiplicity of equilibrium will be lost as a result. The reason is that the imposition of jSj
interest rate rules will lead to jSj no-arbitrage conditions, exactly the same as the number
of conditions following from our approach with exogenous policies by the bank.
9 Conclusion
We have presented a general equilibrium level that has the same level of generality as
the Arrow-Debreu model and that incorporates the main desiderata of the macroeconomic
literature known as the new neoclassical synthesis. Agents form rational expectations on
prices of commodities and assets, interest rates, supply constraints and demand constraints,
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in a stochastically developing multi-period economy. Commodity prices are allowed to be
sticky, implying that monetary policy has non-trivial real consequences. At date-events
where a commodity price is exible, it does not adjust mechanically to some measure of
disequilibrium, but is set at a market clearing level corresponding to the forces of supply
and demand. Since price stickiness involves nominal prices, the model contains a general
formulation of the monetary transaction technology.
The main result of the paper is that rational expectations are compatible with an jST j-
dimensional set of equilibria and that in the presence of price stickiness this indeterminacy
of equilibrium is real rather than nominal. This poses serious challenges to the issue of
how households coordinate their expectations on one particular equilibrium and if they
succeed in coordinating their expectations, on which equilibrium that will be. Under
strong stationary assumptions and with exible prices, it might seem natural that they
coordinate on an equilibrium where future ination is deterministic. Without stationary
assumptions, and in the presence of price stickiness, such equilibria do generally not exist,
and the issue of equilibrium selection becomes even more prominent.
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